Abstract. In this paper we present a differential fault attack on the stream cipher MICKEY 2.0 which is in eStream's hardware portfolio. While fault attacks have already been reported against the other two eStream hardware candidates Trivium and Grain, no such analysis is known for MICKEY. Using the standard assumptions for fault attacks, we show that by injecting around 2 16.7 faults and performing 2 32.5
Introduction
The stream cipher MICKEY 2.0 [4] was designed by Steve Babbage and Matthew Dodd as a submission to the eStream project. The cipher has been selected as a part of eStream's final hardware portfolio. MICKEY is a synchronous, bit-oriented stream cipher designed for low hardware complexity and high speed. After a TMD tradeoff attack [15] against the initial version of MICKEY (version 1), the designers responded by tweaking the design by increasing the state size from 160 to 200 bits and altering the values of some control bit tap locations. These changes were incorporated in MICKEY 2.0 and these are the only differences between MICKEY version 1 and MICKEY 2.0. While MICKEY 2.0 uses an 80-bit key and a variable length IV, a modified version of the cipher, MICKEY-128 2.0 that uses a 128-bit key [5] was also proposed by the designers.
The name MICKEY is derived from "Mutual Irregular Clocking Key-stream generator" which describes the behavior of the cipher. The state consists of two 100-bit shift registers named R and S, each of which is irregularly clocked and controlled by the other. The cipher specification underlines that each key can be used with up to 2 40 different IVs of the same length, and that 2 40 key-stream bits can be generated from each key-IV pair. Very little cryptanalysis of MICKEY 2.0 is available in literature. In fact it has been noted in [3, Section 3.2] that other than the observation related to time or power analysis attacks [11] on straightforward implementations of the MICKEY family, there have been no known cryptanalytic advances on these ciphers. To the best our knowledge, the work in this paper presents the first cryptanalytic result of MICKEY 2.0 in terms of differential fault attack.
Since the work of [6, 7] , fault attacks have been employed to test the strengths/weaknesses of cryptographic primitives. Such attacks on stream ciphers was first described by Hoch and Shamir [12] . A typical fault attack [12] involves the random injection of faults (using laser shots/clock glitches [17, 18] ) in a device (typically initialized by a secret key) which changes one or more bits of its internal state. The adversary then attempts to deduce information about the internal state/secret key using the output stream from this faulty device. In order to perform the attack, certain privileges are required like the ability to re-key the device, control the timing of the fault etc. The attack becomes impractical and unrealistic if the adversary is granted too many privileges. In this work we assume the following privileges of the adversary which are generally acceptable in cryptanalytic literature:
1. She can re-key the cipher with the original key-IV and restart cipher operations multiple times. 2. She has full control over the timing of fault injection. 3. She can inject a fault that alters the bit value of one randomly chosen register location in either the R or the S register. 4. She is however unable to fix the exact location of the R or S register where she wants to inject the fault. Obtaining the fault location by comparison of the fault-free and the faulty key-streams is one of the challenges while mounting the fault attack.
As has been previously mentioned, these assumptions do not ask for more privileges than the existing works [9, 13] . In fact, there are some published works where the assumptions made are quite strong, e.g., the works [8, 10, 16] considers that the attacker can reproduce multiple faults in the same (but unknown) locations, that we do not need to assume.
Differential fault attack is a special class of fault attack in which the attacker uses the difference between fault-free and faultless key-streams to deduce the internal state or the secret key of the cipher. In case of MICKEY 2.0, the differential attack is possible due to the rather simplistic nature of the output function (r 0 + s 0 ) used to produce key-stream bits. Additionally, there are some interesting properties of the state update function in MICKEY that help facilitate the attack that we shall describe. The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present a description of the cipher which is suitable for our analysis, where we also present some notations that will be henceforth used in the paper. The complete attack is described in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 An alternate description of the MICKEY 2.0 PRGA and some notations A detailed description of MICKEY 2.0 is available in [4] . For convenience of the reader we also describe it in Appendix A. MICKEY 2.0 uses an 80-bit key and a variable length IV, the length of which may be between 0 and 80 bits. The physical structure of the cipher consists of two 100 bit registers R and S. Both registers are initially initialized to the all-zero state, and the three stages of register update 1. IV loading, 2. Key Loading, and 3. Pre Clock are executed sequentially before the production of the first key-stream bit. Thereafter in the PRGA (Pseudo Random bitstream Generation Algorithm) key-stream bits are produced. We will try to give an alternate description of this stage of operation of MICKEY 2.0. Consider a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 to be variables over GF (2) . Let a 0 be defined as follows
Then it is straightforward to see that a 0 can be expressed as a multivariate polynomial over GF(2), i.e., a 0 = (1+a 1 )·a 2 +a 1 ·a 3 . The state registers R and S, during the PRGA are updated by a call to the CLOCK KG routine, which in turn calls the CLOCK R and the CLOCK S routine. In both these routines state update is done via a number of If-Else constructs. As a result of this the state update may be equivalently expressed as a series of multi-variate polynomials over GF (2) where ρ i , β i are polynomial functions over GF (2) . The exact forms of ρ i , β i are described in Appendix B. Before describing the attack we will describe certain notations that will be used henceforth. . 3. R t,∆r φ (t 0 ), S t,∆r φ (t 0 ) (resp. R t,∆s φ (t 0 ), S t,∆s φ (t 0 )) are used to denote the internal states of the cipher at the beginning of round t of the PRGA, when a fault has been injected in location φ of R (resp. S) at the beginning of round t 0 of the PRGA. 4. z i,∆r φ (t 0 ) or z i,∆s φ (t 0 ) denotes the key-stream bit produced in the i th PRGA round, after a fault has been injected in location φ of R or S at the beginning of round t 0 of the PRGA. By z i , we refer to the fault-free key-stream bit produced in the i th PRGA round.
Complete description of the Attack
We will start with a few algorithmic tools that will be used later to mount the attack. Figure 1 .
Known initially Calculated Proof. Since R 0 is known and so is CR t for each t ∈ [0, 99] we can construct all the bits of R 1 by calculating r
Once all the bits of R 1 are known, all the bits of R 2 may be determined by calculating
Similarly all the bits of R 3 , R 4 , . . . , R 99 can be calculated successively. As before, we begin by observing that the functions β i for all values of i ∈ [1, 99] are of the form , i = 0, 1, 2. Continuing in such a bottom up manner we can successively determine 4 bits of S 96 , 5 bits of S 95 and eventually all the 100 bits of S 0 . The process is explained pictorially in Figure 2 .
Known initially Calculated 
Faulting specific bits of R, S
Before getting into the details of the attack, we further note that the output key-stream bits z t , z t+1 , . . . can also be expressed as polynomial functions over R t , S t . We have
The exact forms of θ 0 , θ 1 , θ 2 are given in Table 1 .
In the rest of this section we will assume that the adversary is able to (a) re-key the device containing the cipher with the original key-IV, (b) apply faults to specific bit locations in the R, S registers and (c) exercise control over the timing of fault injection. Note that (b) is a stronger assumption, but we do not need it in our attack. We are using this assumption here to build a sub-routine. In the next subsection we shall demonstrate how the adversary can partially identify the location of any fault injected at a random position by comparing the faulty and fault-free key-streams.
We begin by observing the following differential properties of the functions θ 0 , θ 1 , θ 2 . 
These differential properties have the following immediate implications.
The above equations hold for all the values of t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. This implies that if the adversary is able to re-key the device with the original key-IV pair multiple times and apply faults at PRGA rounds t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , 100 at precisely 1 the R register locations 0, 67 and the S register location 99, then by observing the difference between the fault-less and faulty key-stream bits, she would be able to recover the values of r t 0 , CR t , CS t for all values of t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 100. The fault at each register location must be preceded by re-keying.
Determining the other bits Hereafter, the values s 
Note that r t 99 is the only unknown linear term in these equations and hence its value too can be determined immediately. At this point, we have the following state bits with us:
Now by using the techniques outlined in Lemma 1 we can determine all the bits of the state R 0 . Thereafter using Lemma 2, one can determine all the bits of S 0 . Thus we have recovered the entire internal state at the beginning of the PRGA.
How to identify the random locations where faults are injected
In this subsection we will show how the adversary can identify the locations of randomly applied faults to the registers R and S. Although it will not be possible to conclusively determine the location of faults applied to each and every location of R and the S registers, we will show that the adversary can, with some probability, identify faulty streams corresponding to locations 0, 67 of R and 99 of S. The adversary will then use the techniques described in Subsection 3.1 to complete the attack.
To help with the process of fault location identification, we define the first and second Signature vectors for the location φ of R as
for all choices of R t , S t , 0, otherwise.
for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , l − 1. Here l ≈ 40 is a suitably chosen constant.
Remark 1. The value of l should be large enough so that one can differentiate 100 randomly generated bit sequences over GF (2) by comparing the first l bits of each sequence. By Birthday paradox, this requires the value of l to be atleast 2 · log 2 100 ≈ 14. We take l = 40 as computer simulations show that this value of l is sufficient to make a successful distinction with high probability.
Similarly one can define Signature vectors for any location φ the register S.
for all choices of R t , S t , 0, otherwise. The task for the fault location identification routine is to determine the fault location φ of R (or S) by analyzing the difference between z t , z t+1 , . . . and z t,∆r φ (t), z t+1,∆r φ (t), . . . (or z t,∆s φ (t), z t+1,∆s φ (t), . . .) by using the Signature vectors Ψ
Note that the i th bit of Ψ 1 r φ is 1 if and only if the (t + i) th key-stream bits produced by R t , S t and R t,∆r φ (t), S t,∆r φ (t) are the same for all choices of the internal state R t , S t and that i th bit of Ψ 2 r φ is 1 if the above key-stream bits are different for all choices of the internal state. Using this fact, one can devise the heuristic given in Algorithm 1 for the calculation of the Signature vectors.
Remark 2. Note that the value of N used in this algorithm should be large enough so that if the (t+i) th bits (0 ≤ i ≤ 100) generated by two randomly chosen states R t , S t and R t,∆r φ (t), S t,∆r φ (t) are not equal for all R t , S t then for at least 1 of N randomly chosen R t , S t the (t+i) th keystream bits generated by them should be actually unequal. By computer simulations N = 2 20 has been found to be sufficient for this purpose.
One can compute the Signature vectors for all the fault locations in S in a similar manner. The complete list of Signature vectors for all the bit locations in R, S can be found in Appendix C. The concept of Signature vectors to deduce the location of a randomly applied fault was introduced in [8] . However the analysis of [8] can not be reproduced for MICKEY 2.0, since a lot of different register locations have the same Signature vector. However one can observe the following which are important to mount the attack. 
[1] = 1, and Ψ 2 r 67 Proof. Though some of the cases are similar, we present each of the cases for clarity. Proofs for the cases A to F are described separately below.
A. We have
for all φ ∈ [1, 99] and so we have 
100 . 
So, Ψ 
for all φ ∈ [1, 99] and so we have
E. Since θ 1 is a function of r 0 , r 67 , s 34 , r 99 , s 99 only, for any φ ∈ [1, 99] \ {34, 99} we have 
Thus the proof. Now, consider the attack scenario in which the adversary is able to re-key the device with the same key-IV multiple number of times and inject a single fault at a random location of register R at the beginning of any particular PRGA round t ∈ [0, 100] and obtain faulty key-streams. She continues the process until she obtains 100 different faulty key-streams corresponding to 100 different fault locations in R and for each t ∈ [0, 100] (as mentioned earlier this is done by comparing the first l bits of each faulty key-stream sequence). Assuming that every location has equal probability of getting injected by fault, the above process on an average takes around 100
9.02 faults [2] and hence re-keyings for each value of t ∈ [0, 100] and hence a total of 101 · 2 9.02 ≈ 2 15.68 faults. The process has to be repeated for the S register, and so the expected number of faults is 2 · 2 15.68 = 2 16.68 . Mathematically speaking, if we define
then the adversary at this point has knowledge of the 100 differential key-streams η t,r φ = Z t + ∆ r φ Z t for each value of t ∈ [0, 100]. The adversary however does not know the exact fault location corresponding to any differential stream i.e. she has been unable to assign fault location labels to any of the differential streams. With this information in hand we shall study the implications of the observations A to F. [0] = 1, ∀φ ∈ [1, 99] guarantees that that there is exactly one differential stream with this property. This implies that out of the 100 differential streams for any PRGA round t the one and only differential stream with this property must have been produced due to a fault on the 0 th location in S.
Implication of E, F: Once the differential stream corresponding to the 0 th location has been labelled we now turn our attention to the remaining 99 streams. The statement E guarantees that of the remaining 99 streams at least 97 have the property
Statement F guarantees that the number of streams with the property
is at most 2 and at least 1.
Case 1 If the number of streams that satisfy (P3) is 98 then the lone stream satisfying (P4) must have been produced due to fault on location 99 of S. Once the stream corresponding to location 99 of S has been labelled, we can use Eqn (3) to determine CS t = η t,s 99 [2] . Case 2 If the number of streams satisfying (P4) is 2 then it implies that these streams were produced due to faults in location 34, 99 of S.
(i) Now if the bit indexed 2 of both these vectors are equal then we can safely assume
(ii) A confusion occurs when η t,s 99 [2] = η t,s 34 [2] . In such a situation we would be unable to conclusively able to determine the value of CS t .
Assuming independence, we assume that Cases 1, 2 have equal probability of occurring. Given the occurrence of Case 2, we can also assume that 2(i), 2(ii) occurs with equal probability. Therefore the probability of confusion, i.e., the probability that we are unable to determine the value of CS t for any t is approximately equal to . Let γ denote the number of t ∈ [0, 100] such that CS t can not be conclusively determined then γ is distributed according to γ ∼ Binomial(101, 1 4 ). Therefore the expected value of γ is E(γ) = 101 · In such a situation the adversary must guess the γ values of CS t to perform the attack, which implies that the adversary must perform the calculations in Section 3.1 and Lemma 1, Lemma 2 a total of 2 γ times to complete the attack. For the correct value of the guesses, the calculated state R 0 , S 0 will produce the given fault-free key-stream sequence.
We present a complete description of the attack in Algorithm 2.
Generate and record the fault-free keystream z 0 , z 1 , z 2 , . . . for some key-IV K, IV t ← 0; while t ≤ 100 do while 100 different faulty key-stream sequences ∆r φ Zt have not been obtained do Re-key the cipher with key-IV K, IV ; Inject a fault at a random unknown location φ ∈ [0, 99] in R at PRGA round t; Record the faulty key-stream sequence ∆r φ Zt; end t ← t + 1; end Calculate r t 0 , CRt, ∀t ∈ [0, 100] using A, B, C; t ← 0; while t ≤ 100 do while 100 different faulty key-stream sequences ∆s φ Zt have not been obtained do Re-key the cipher with key-IV K, IV ; Inject a fault at a random unknown location φ ∈ [0, 99] in S at PRGA round t; Record the faulty key-stream sequence ∆s φ Zt; end t ← t + 1; end Using D, E, F calculate CSt, for all such t ∈ [0, 100] for which there is no confusion; Let the number of undecided bits CSt = γ; for Each of the 2 γ guesses of the undecided CSt's do 
Issues related to the length of the IV
It is known that MICKEY 2.0 employs a variable length IV of length at most 80. So if v is the length of the IV then the cipher will run for v + 80 (Key loading) + 100 (Preclock) clock intervals before entering the PRGA phase. Our attack requires that the first faults are to be injected at the beginning of the PRGA. In order to do that the adversary must know the value of v. This not a strong assumption as IVs are assumed to be known. However even if the adversary does not know the IV or its length the attack can be performed. Since 0 ≤ v ≤ 80 must be satisfied, the strategy of the adversary who does not know the value of v will be as follows. She will inject the first set of faults at clock round 260 which corresponds to the PRGA round p = 260 − 180 − v = 80 − v. After performing the attack, the adversary will end up constructing the internal state R p , S p instead of R 0 , S 0 . Finding the value of p by looking at the faultless key-stream sequence is straightforward.
Complexity of the Attack
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the attack requires the adversary to obtain 100 different faulty key-streams corresponding to all fault locations in R for PRGA rounds t ∈ [0, 100]. This requires 101·100·
15.68 faults on an average. The same process must be repeated for the register S and hence the expected number of total faults is 2 16.68 . The computational overload comes from guessing the γ values of CS t which can not be found out by observing the differential key-streams. This requires a computational effort proportional to 2 γ . Since γ is distributed according to Binomial(101, 1 4 ), the expected value of γ is 25.25. The expected value of the computation complexity is therefore given by E(2 γ ) = 
Conclusion
A differential fault attack against the stream cipher MICKEY 2.0 is presented. The work is one of the first cryptanalytic attempts against this cipher and requires reasonable computational effort. The attack is somewhat made possible due to the simplicity of the output function and certain register update operations of MICKEY 2.0 and would have been thwarted had these been of a more complex nature. It would be interesting to study efficient counter-measures with minimum tweak in the design. Given our work in this paper, differential fault attacks are now known against all of the three ciphers in the hardware portfolio of eStream. The attacks on all the 3 ciphers use exactly the same fault model that is similar to what described in this paper. Table 2 summarizes the fault requirements. To the best of our knowledge, there was no published fault attack on MICKEY 2.0. prior to our work. We believe that one of the reasons this remained open for such a long time could be that the cipher uses irregular clocking to update its state registers. Hence it becomes difficult to determine the location of a randomly applied fault injected in either the R or S register by simply comparing the faulty and fault-free key-streams. The idea explained in Theorem 1 and its implications are instrumental in mounting the attack. The total number of faults is indeed much higher when we compare it with the other two eStream hardware candidates. However, this seems natural as MICKEY 2.0 has more complex structure than Trivium or Grain v1. The CLOCK KG routine We define another operation 
CLOCK KG(R, S, M IXIN G, IN P U T BIT )

CLOCK S(S, IN P U T BIT S, CON T ROL BIT S)
Working of the Cipher We will now describe the algorithm governing the functioning of the cipher. Let K = k 0 , k 1 , . . . , k 79 be the 80 bit key used by the cipher. Let IV = iv 0 , iv 1 , . . . , iv v−1 be the v-bit IV (0 ≤ v ≤ 80). Then the cipher operates in the 4 stages as described below.
STAGE 1. IV loading
Initialize both R and S to the all-zero state. 
